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Abstract 
This paper derives a key monotonicity property common to all dividend signalling 
models: the greater the rate that dividend income is taxed relative to capital gains 
income, the greater the value of information revealed by a given dividend, and hence the 
greater the associated excess return. This monotonicity condition is tested with robust 
non-parametric techniques. No evidence is found to support dividend signalling models. 
The same results are inconsistent with tax-based CAPM arguments.
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TESTING DIVIDEND SIGNALLING MODELS 
Dan Bernhardt and J. Fiona Robertson 
I Introduction. 
Since the publication of Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979), financial 
economists have explored the possible signalling properties of dividends and 
other financial activities. Research into the signalling properties of 
dividends has been motivated by an attempt to explain the apparent excess 
returns observed following announcements by firms of favorable dividends. 
Building on the work of Spence (1973), Bhattacharya (1979) produced an 
internally consistent model of Modigliani and Miller's (1963) "informational 
content of dividends hypothesis", demonstrating how dividends could allow 
insiders to credibly communicate information about the expected future value 
of the firm to less informed outsiders. 1 Credibility of the signal requires 
that it not pay low quality firms to mimic the behavior of high quality firms. 
The majority of the empirical studies of the "information content of 
dividends hypothesis" have used an event study methodology to investigate the 
2 response of share prices to the announcement of changes in dividend levels. 
Many of these papers found evidence supportive of the view that there appears 
to be a stock price response to changes in firms' dividend policies (Aharony 
and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Brickley (1983), Charest (1978), 
Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988), Kalay 
(1980), Kalay and Lowenstein (1986), Laub (1976), Patell and Wolfson (1984), 
Pettit (1972) (1976)). Such results have been viewed as supportive of the 
view that dividend announcements are interpreted by the market as being 
informative of firm value. A few early studies focused on examining the 
predictive content of dividend policy for future share performance, rather 
than investigating the existence of an announcement effect, and found less 
evidence to support the view that dividend announcements convey additional 
information to the market (Ang (1975), Gonedes (1978), Penman (1983). Watts 
(1973), (1978)). 
1credibility of the signals here refers to the recognition that the signalling 
aspect of financial policy must be immune to the possibility that insiders 
could strategically manipulate the signals sent in such a way as to allow them 
to benefit from temporary mispricing of the firm ' s  shares. 
2Notable exceptions are Kalay (1982), John and Mishra (1990), and John and 
Lang (1991), which are discussed below. 
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Eades (1982) takes a different approach to testing dividend signalling 
models. Rather than trying to detect the presence of an announcement effect 
from dividend changes or examine the predictive content of dividend policy, 
Eades derives and tests specific predictions obtained from comparative static 
analysis of a formal dividend signalling model. 3 Eades analyzes a version of 
Bhattacharya' s  signalling model and derives two testable hypotheses: (1) an 
inverse relationship between dividend yield and a firm's own variance of 
returns; and (2) the "relative signalling strength hypothesis" (RSS) which 
states that "higher risk firms exhibit stronger changes in value relative to 
their lower risk counterparts for any given change in dividends" (p. 473). 
Eades finds empirical support for the first of these results but strongly 
rejects the RSS hypothesis. 
This paper's test of signalling theories of dividends is in the spirit of 
Eades in that we derive and test a comparative static result derived from 
dividend signalling models. The RSS hypothesis tested by Eades was derived 
from a particular model of dividend signalling with particular specifications 
of functional forms and distributional assumptions within that model. In 
contrast we test a non-parametric comparative static result that holds for any 
dividend signalling model, rather than a comparative static derived from a 
particular example of such a model. 
We argue that a testable hypothesis that can be derived within the 
context of any signalling theory of dividends is that there is a monotonic 
relationship between the marginal tax rate on dividend income relative to 
capital gains and the amount of "good news" revealed by any sized dividend. 
The higher is the relative tax rate on dividends the better is the "type" 
revealed by any level of dividend yield, and hence, under rational 
expectations, the greater the associated excess return. It is important to 
note that this result holds whether or not the underlying signalling argument 
is tax based. 
3 John and Mishra also derive comparative statics from an explicit signalling 
model. They allude to empirical evidence from other researchers consistent 
with their predictions. John and Lang (1991) derive testable implications 
from a specific signalling model regarding correlations between the 
announcement of dividend changes, the extent of insider trade and the response 
of stock prices. They find weak empirical supporting results. 
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This observation suggests a simple and robust method for testing all 
signalling theories of dividends. Over the period 1962-1988 there have been 
numerous changes in the US Federal tax code governing the taxation of dividend 
income and capital gains in the US. We identify 16 distinct tax regimes and 
order them from most favorable to dividend income relative to capital gains 
income, to least favorable. Signalling theories predict that for a given 
dividend yield, the good news released, and hence the associated excess 
return, should be least when dividend income receives the most favorable tax 
treatment, and the excess return should be greatest when dividend income 
receives the least favorable tax treatment. We refer to this as the 
monotonicity property of signalling models. It is important to note that we 
can distinguish between whether information is released as an indirect by­
product of dividend announcements (e.g. higher dividends reveal more cash on 
hand) and whether information is released as a result of signalling. The 
former hypothesis predicts that information release should be positive, but 
independent of the tax regime. 
Since a generic dividend signalling model does not predict a particular 
functional form for the relationship between tax rates and excess returns for 
a given dividend yield, we test this monotonicity relationship without 
imposing particular parametric restrictions. In particular we employ non­
parametric tests of rank order correlation (Kendall's tau and Heoffding's 
distribution free tests) to test for the predicted monotonic relationship. 
The advantage of these tests is that they are robust, they allow us to control 
for the dividend yield levels, and we do not have to worry about misspecifying 
the functional form. 
We find no evidence of correlation between the relative tax treatment of 
dividends and the excess returns earned following dividend announcements 
(controling for the size of the dividend payout and firm size) .  W e  thus find 
no evidence to support the view that dividends act as a signal of firm value. 
More precisely, the paper provides strong evidence against the joint 
hypothesis that the marginal investor is taxed and that dividend yield serves 
as a signal of firm value. Peterson, Peterson and Ang (1985) examine income 
tax returns and estimate a marginal effective tax rate on dividend income of 
303 for 1979, suggesting that the marginal investor is taxed. 
This evidence is also inconsistent with the tax-based CAPM models of 
3 
Brennan (1979) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980, 1983). In these 
models investors demand compensation in the form of higher pre-tax returns on 
high dividend stocks to compensate for the higher tax cost of dividends 
relative to capital gains; higher dividend taxes raise the required pre-tax 
4 return. 
Section 2 derives in a general context the monotonicity property that is 
the basis for our test. Section 3 examines the theoretic literature on 
dividend signalling, identifying that the monotonicity property holds in each 
paper. Section 4 explains the various tax code changes that have occurred in 
the treatment of capital gains taxes in the U.S. over the period 1960-1988. 
Section 5 explains the data to be employed and section 6 explains the non-
parametric tests employed. Section 7 contains results, following which 
section 8 discusses the results and draws conclusions. 
II. A General Signalling Theory. 
The essential relationship that we wish to test is a key comparative 
static that holds for any dividend signalling model. This result holds that 
the level of dividend payout needed to signal any given level of hidden firm 
characteristic is lower the higher the marginal tax rate on dividend income 
relative to capital gains. The simple intuition behind this result is that 
any signalling model implies selecting an optimal level of dividend payout by 
equating the marginal cost of the signal level to the marginal benefit of the 
signal level. The marginal cost of the signal ( dividend payout) is a strictly 
increasing function of the marginal tax rate on dividends and a decreasing 
function of the marginal tax rate on capital gains. This monotonic 
relationship holds whether or not the signalling aspect of dividends derives 
from the tax rate. Since the marginal benefit of the signal is independent of 
the tax rate, we obtain the predicted inverse relationship between dividend 
payout levels and dividend tax rates for any quality of firm that signals 
any given amount of good news can be signalled with a lower dividend level if 
the marginal cost of dividend payouts is higher. 
Consider the following description of a general (scalar) dividend 
4A recent study by Christie and Huang (1992) focuses on the tax effect of 
dividends across tax regimes. 
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signalling model. Let D denote the dividend (signal) level, P denote the 
market price of a firm's shares, and 8 denote some characteristic known only 
to the informed manager(s) of the firm. 8 is the variable to be signalled to 
the uninformed. The informed's welfare depends on both the current share 
price and the true value of the firm. 5 Denote this relationship V(P, 8). 
Note that av IBP > o. In a signalling equilibrium P depends monotonical!y6 on 
D, P(D) with P' > 0, so that we can write V(P(D), 8).
There is some cost associated with sending the signal (issuing 
dividends). Part of this cost is the tax cost, denoted i:D. In order for a 
signalling equilibrium to exist, we also require that the marginal cost of 
dividend issuance depends on the type of the firm. Hence we write the total 
cost of dividends as C(D,8) + i:D (or more generally as C(D, T, 8), where BCIBD 
> 0, dC/Bi: > 0, 82C/8D8i: > 0).
The informed choose D in order to maximize V(P(D ) ,  8)  - C(D, i:,  8) ,  
taking account of the dependence of P on D. In a signalling equilibrium P(D) 
must be "informationally consistent" (Riley, 1979), requiring that P(D) = 1T(8, 
D), where TI( . )  denotes the "true" market value of a firm of type 8 paying out 
a dividend of D, and BTI/88 > 0 so that higher values of 8 correspond to higher
quality firms. An optimal signalling equilibrium requires selecting the level 
* 
D that solves: 
maxD V(P(D), 8) - C(D, T, 8), 
where P(D) = 1T(8, D). 
(I) 
As Riley shows, two necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a solution to (1) with P(D) * P (i.e. that involves signalling)
are: 
(1) The existence of a finite D that maximizes firm value absent 
5This is a critical characteristic of all dividend signalling models. Absent 
a dependence on current share price, the insiders would have no incentive to 
signal firm value to outsiders since they would not benefit from the 
transmission of information. Absent some concern for future share value ( once 
the truth becomes known to all) the insiders al ways wish to raise current 
share price by signalling good news, unconcerned about the future impact of 
tne1r false signal, so that no credible signal can emerge. 
6The monotonicity of P(D) follows from the results of Mailath (1987). 
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any signalling effects. 7 
(2) The "single-crossing property": 
- < 0 B 
[BC(D,T,9)/BD l
Be BV(P(D),9)/BP
for all 9. (2) 
Note that absent dividend taxes the Modigliani-Miller (1968) conditions 
violate condition l ,  since under MM any level of dividend is optimal absent 
signalling effects. The existence of a positive tax differential on dividends 
versus capital gains ensures that condition 1 is satisfied since the optimal 
dividend level absent signalling is then equal to zero. Note too, that if 
there are no 
then condition 
direct benefits to the signalling activity that depend on 8, 8
z (2) reduces to a CIBDBe < O; marginal signalling costs must be
inversely related to firm quality. 
Solving the first order conditions (FOC) for problem (1), we obtain
BV(P(D), 9) 
BP 
BTT(e, Dl de 
Be dD + 
BV(P(D), 9) 
BP 
BTT(e, Dl 
BD 
or, for the special case where C(D, T, 9) = C(D, 9) + TD, 
BV(P(D),8) 
BP 
BTT(e, Dl d e  
ae dD + 
BV(P(D),9) 
BP 
BTT(e, Dl 
BD 
= 
= 
BC(D , 9, T) 
BD 
BC(D, eJ 
BD + T. 
This FOC characterizes a differential equation for the optimal signalling
function D(9). Infinitely many solutions to this FOC exist. Identification
of a particular signalling equilibrium is typically achieved by identifying 
the most efficient of all the solutions to the differential equation. An 
early justification for this procedure can be found in Riley (1979) .  Cho and 
Kreps (1987 ) ,  and Banks anq Sobel (1987) present equilibrium refinements that 
identify these equilibria in most signalling games. In the presence of 
dissipative signals (such as dividend taxes), this selection procedure 
identifies the solution in which the iowest quality firm selects a zero 
dividend. We should emphasize, though, that our empirical analysis is robust 
7 This is needed to prevent all firms from setting D at such a high level that
it is irnpossible to have any information transmitted. 
8This occurs for instance in Spence's signalling model where education adds no 
value but simply acts as a dissipative signal. 
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to the particular equilibrium selection, provided that the same equilibrium is 
selected over time. 
To derive the impact of changes in dividend taxes on the optimal dividend 
payout level for any quality of firm, we carry out the comparative static: 
* 
dD /dT = < 0 from SOC. (3) 
An increase in marginal tax rate, T, leads the level of the dividend, D, to be 
set at a point where the net marginal benefit is higher, which, by second 
* 
order conditions, ensures that dD /dT < 0. 
Notice that in the absence of some direct benefit of dividends, dividend 
taxes alone do not satisfy the single-crossing property (2) since B2CIBTBB = 
0. Thus, if dividends are to act as a signal in a scalar signalling model,
some other aspect of dividend costs must generate the needed relationship 
between marginal dividend costs and firm quality that provides separation 
(this is not true in vector signalling models because property (2) is not 
required for multiple signals). However, even if dividend taxes are not the 
feature of the model that generates 
the optimal dividend level still depends 
single-crossing, 
9 on -r. 
equation (3) shows that 
To derive the monotonicity condition in a multiple signalling model, note 
that with multiple signals the firm chooses the most efficient (cost­
minimizing) mix of signals. The cost-minimizing mix of signals is determined 
where the marginal cost of each signal is equated across all signals used. An 
increase in the marginal cost of one signal (as would occur with an increase 
in the tax on dividend payouts) leads to an equilibrium in which the mix of 
signals is altered so that less signalling is done with the relatively more 
expensive dividend signal. 
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3a. Monotonicity in Scalar Signalling Models. 
Early signalling models (Bhattacharya (1979), Kalay (1980), Talmor 
Bhattacharya's (1979) model demonstrated this key fact since this model 
contained both dividend taxes that did not satisfy condition (2) and an 
outside financing cost that did satisfy (2), so that the presence of dividend 
taxes was not the feature of the model that drove the ability of dividends to 
act as a signal: even absent dividend taxes, dividends acted as a signal. 
Within this framework Bhattacharya shows that the optimal dividend level 
depends on T. 
7 
(1982), Hakanson (1982) ,  Miller and Rock (1985), and Bar Yosef and Hoffman 
(1986) )  seek to explain both the dividend payout and their informational 
content. These papers apply Spence's (1973) general signalling theory to the 
case of dividends. Dividend payments by firms act as a signal of either 
current or expected firm value. The models differ in two regards, the form of 
dividend cost function, C(D, T, 9), and the motivation behind why the 
informed's objective function is of the form V(P(D), 9) rather than being
concerned solely with P(D) (current value) or solely with future value. 
Bhattacharya (1979), Kalay (1980), Talmor (1982), Hakanson (1982) ,  and 
Bar Yosef and Hoffman (1986) assume that the cost of dividend issuance arises 
due to the corporate transaction costs of refinancing cash shortfalls. In 
Kalay this is due to the assumed managerial reward scheme which punishes 
managers for refinancing cash shortfalls; in the other papers the cost is an 
external financing penalty. In Miller and Rock, the cost associated with the 
issuance of dividends arises from the cost of foregone investment projects 
that could have been financed with the funds used to issue dividends. 
To motivate the form of objective function it is either assumed that the 
form of managerial reward scheme produces a concern for both current and true 
value or that managers act in the interests of current firm shareholders whose 
time horizon is such that they care about both current share prices and future 
share prices. 
Kalay (1980), Talmor (1982), Hakanson (1982) ,  and Bar Yosef and Hoffman 
(1986) present extensions, variations and special cases of Bhattacharya's 
initial 1979 paper. Informed managers know the cash flow distribution of 
their firm. The possible cash flow distributions can be ordered according to 
first order stochastic dominance so that there is a well defined notion of 
firm quality. Assuming that making up future cash shortfalls from external 
financing is costly to the informed and that firms are committed to always 
paying out promised dividends in full, informed managers maximize an objective 
function that is a weighted average of the current stock price and the ex post 
(after cash flows are realized) stock price. In this scenario managers of 
high quality firms pay a dividend just high enough to distinguish themselves 
from the low quality firms, which are discouraged from mimicking the behavior 
of the high quality firm by the greater probability of having to turn to 
costly external financing to pay the dividend given their lower expected cash 
flow. The benefit of paying a dividend is the same for both types of firm 
8 
(the positive current stock price return) but the cost is higher for a low 
quality firm because they are more likely to have to resort to external 
finance. These models explicitly contain a differential tax on dividend 
payouts and derive comparative statics results demonstrating that dividend 
payout levels are a decreasing function of tax levels. 
Miller and Rock assume that the level of investment spending by the firm 
10 is determined as a residual after dividend payout. Outsiders know everything 
about the firm except for the current cash flow level which is assumed to be 
correlated with the profitability of investment. The level of investment 
undertaken by the firm can then be inf erred from the level of cash payout and 
knowledge of the firm's sources and uses of funds statement. The resulting 
signalling cost emerges from the diversion of potential investment funds to 
pay dividends, because underinvestment is more costly on the margin for less 
profitable firms. If we add a tax on cash distributions at rate T, then the 
equation relating the inferred firm quality, X, to dividend payout, D, is 
X'(D) = ( T - 1) [ F'(X- D ) -
(l+i) ] 
kF'( X - D )  + ko ' 
where F' is the marginal productivity of investment, 0 measures the 
correlation between current and future earnings, i is the discount rate and k 
is the fraction of shares sold to outsiders. This shows that for any dividend 
D, the implied firm quality X is larger the higher is T, so that the higher is 
T, the lower is the dividend necessary to signal any given firm quality. 
3b. Monotonicity in Vector (Multiple) Signal Models. 
While the early signalling literature built on the results of Spence, 
with exogenously specified signalling variables, more recent work has analyzed 
multiple signalling models. These models address two criticisms of the 
earlier work: (1) The early papers "explain cash payout more satisfactorily 
than they explain the choice between dividends and repurchases" (Bagwell and 
Shaven (1989) ) .  ( 2 )  Dividends may be capable of acting as a signal of share 
value but appear to be a very expensive form of signal. Can dividends still 
play a signalling role in an equilibrium where firms optimally choose how to 
signal once we allow for other, possible cheaper, signals to exist? 
10 This is in marked contrast to the Fisherian aspect of the MM result. 
9 
An early contribution to the general theory of multiple signalling models 
was Engers (1987) who establishes results analogous to Spence's single 
crossing property for multiple signal models. An important aspect of Engers' 
condition is that only a certain quasi-concavity condition on the signalling 
cost function is required. In particular, it is not required that all signals 
satisfy the single-crossing property individually. One important case that 
satisfies Engers' condition arises when there are two signals and the cost of 
one satisfies single crossing and the cost of the other is linear in the 
signal level. This is important since it means that as long as the other 
signal exhibits increasing marginal cost with quality, that dividends can act 
as a signal even if the only cost of dividends is the ( linear) tax cost. 
John and Williams (1985) address specifically the question of how firms 
choose between stock repurchases and dividend payouts in the presence of 
differential dividend taxes. Exogenous demands for liquidity by shareholders 
and by the firm to finance activity are assumed. Shareholders wish to avoid 
dilution of ownership that occurs if they meet their liquidity needs by 
selling shares. In equilibrium the firm meets these liquidity demands by 
making cash disbursements in the form of dividends or share repurchases. 
Dividend payouts are subject to a tax cost while repurchases (or share sales 
to generate liquidity) are costly due to their impact on the ownership share 
of current shareholders. This dilution is more costly the more profitable the 
firm, so the informed managers, acting in the interests of current 
shareholders, may distribute a taxable dividend if outsiders realize that this 
signals high expected profits and so re-price outstanding shares appropriately 
(allowing the firm to raise needed capital with the issuance of less new 
shares, further reducing dilution of ownership). Dividend payouts thus 
substitute for having to sell shares with the associated dilution cost. The 
gain from avoiding this dilution cost outweighs the tax disadvantage of 
dividends, so that the cost minimizing mix of signals requires some dividend 
payout. The optimal mix of signals occurs where these marginal costs are 
equated across payout methods, so that the optimal dividend payout for any 
quality of firm "decreases in the personal tax rate" (p 1063).  
Ofer and Thakor (1987) also analyze the simultaneous use of stock 
repurchases and dividends as signals (in the context of no dividend taxes) .  
Cash disbursements are costly due to the potential need for costly external 
financing (as in Bhattacharya). The relative cost of the two signals differ 
IO 
due to an assumption of risk aversion on the part of the informed owner/ 
managers and differences in the risk exposure characteristics of the two 
signals. Dividend payouts accrue to all shareholders ( including the owner/ 
managers), while it is assumed that the owner/managers are excluded from 
participation in share repurchases to prevent them from falsely signalling and 
then selling out at the incorrectly inflated price. In equilibrium, the 
higher the true value of the firm, the greater the share of the signalling 
that is carried out using repurchases. Even though differential taxes are not 
considered in this analysis, Ofer and Thakor indicate that including taxes 
would alter their results only by lowering the critical firm value below which 
only dividends are used. The key non-mimicry condition -- "the size of the 
dividend payout is just large enough to persuade the [low quality] firm not to 
mimic" ( p  374)) -- can be easily altered to allow for differential taxes. The 
benefit of mimicry (being thought high quality) is independent of the tax 
rate, while the cost of mimicry is raised by a higher dividend tax, so that it 
takes a lower dividend level to achieve separation with a higher tax rate. 
Thus, the analysis of Ofer and Thakor satisfies our monotonicity condition. 
Ambirush, John and Williams (AJW) (1987), and Williams (1988) present
models that combine the cash disbursement cost of Miller and Rock with John 
and Williams' relative cost structure for dividends and repurchases to 
determine the form of cash disbursement used. Williams extends AJW to the 
case of a continuum of types under slightly more restrictive assumptions. 
These papers address the difficulty in interpreting Miller and Rock's  analysis 
in the case of a differential dividend tax by explicitly treating share 
repurchases and dividends as distinct payout methods. As in John and Williams 
the difference in the costs of these payout methods derives from the tax cost 
of dividends versus the dilution cost of repurchases. In common with Miller 
and Rock is the fact that the cost of cash disbursements is due to the implied 
underinvestment resulting from the diversion of funds to cash distributions. 
AJW do not explicitly derive a comparative static relating to changes in the 
dividend tax rate, but Williams does. Williams explicitly solves for the 
optimal dividend function and shows that dD/dT < 0 for all but the lowest 
quality firm (which sets D = oJ.11 
11E . ' f xam1nat1on o 
property holds. 
figures (1) and (2) in AJW reveals that the monotonicity
The slope of the maximand is flattened by higher dividend 
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John and Mishra (1990), and John and Lang (1991) study how dividend 
announcements, when combined with insider trades, can signal firm quality. 
The cost of dividends as a signal results from underinvestment (as in Miller 
and Rock). Once again, even though the analysis does not rely on dividend 
taxes, an increase in the marginal cost of signalling with dividends (a higher 
tax rate) alters the optimal mix of signals so that more signalling is done 
with insider trades and less with dividends if dividends become a more costly 
way to signal. 
Kumar (1988) considers a model where due to differences in risk aversion 
between the informed owner /manager and the uninformed shareholders, there is a 
conflict of interest between these agents in determining the optimal 
investment level of the firm. An informational asymmetry arises because 
managerial productivity is not known by the outside shareholders. Dividends 
are untaxed. Kumar shows that while there is no fully-separating equilibrium 
via dividend signals, a coarse signalling (or semi-separating) equilibrium 
exists in which dividend levels partition managerial productivity, allowing 
investment to at least partially reflect productivity. Once again, even 
though Kumar does not include any dividend taxes in his model, examination of 
his non-mimicry argument reveals that a higher dividend tax rate, other things 
equal, makes it easier to satisfy the required non-mimicry condition, so that 
the model satisfies the monotonicity property. 
Finally, Bernheim (1991) develops a tax-based theory of dividend signals 
to determine the optimal mix of dividends and share repurchases. Higher 
payout levels are costly since they expose the firm to the risk of requiring 
costly external financing. Bernheim adds to Bhattacharya' s analysis the 
possibility that firms can avoid costly external financing via bankruptcy. 
The possibility of bankruptcy prevents the diminishing marginal cost of cash 
disbursements (the single-crossing property in Bhattacharya) from holding 
globally since, with the possibility of avoiding external financing by 
declaring bankruptcy, for very large disbursements the marginal cost of 
disbursements is actually higher for high quality firms. This follows since 
low quality firms are already at the point of bankruptcy so the marginal cost 
taxes while the slope of the non-mimicry constraint is not altered, giving a 
tangency at a lower level of dividend payout as the tax rate is raised. 
12 
to them of additional cash distributions is close to zero, while high quality 
firms are operating below the point of bankruptcy and so are still facing a 
positive marginal cost of outside financing. Hence, disbursements of a 
certain size can act as a signal of firm quality, but if the difference in 
firm quality is large, raising distributions beyond a certain point may not 
help separate out different quality firms. It is here that issuing taxable 
dividends helps achieve separation. A high quality firm can issue 
disbursements up to the point where the marginal cost of disbursements no 
longer satisfies the necessary single-crossing property. Beyond this point 
the firm issues dividends and issues new equity (so that total cash 
distributions are not raised). 
wishing to mimic this policy. 
Taxes prevent the low quality firm from 
As Bernheim demonstrates "an increase in the 
tax rate of dividends reduces both dividends and new equity issues" (page 
468). Hence once again, our key monotonicity property holds. 
4 Tax Treatment of Dividends and Capital Gains, 1962-1988. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, the U.S. Federal tax code applied the same 
personal income tax rate to long-term capital gains and ordinary income 
(including dividend income). This was the first time since 1921 that the 
income tax code has not discriminated against dividend income relative to 
capital gains income. 12 While this change may have been the most dramatic 
change in the relative treatment of capital gains versus ordinary income, 
numerous changes in the tax code over the last three decades have also 
affected the relative tax treatment of capital gains and other income. 
Prior to the Tax Reform Act, 50 percent or more of capital gains were 
excludable from taxable income, reducing the effective tax rate on capital 
gains below that on other forms of income. Over the period 1960-1986 numerous 
changes in income tax rates, tax brackets, exclusion allowances, changes in 
maximum alternative tax rates, changes in the definitions of long-term capital 
gains, and changes in deductability allowances for capital losses, have 
changed the effective tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains. 
12rt is still the case that dividend-paying equity is subject to two levels of 
taxation, first at the corporate income tax rate and then at the personal 
income tax rate (at least for shareholders subject to personal taxes such as 
households). 
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At present, the top tax rate on capital gains is 28 percent (the same as on 
all income). Throughout most of the 1960s this rate was 25 percent. In the 
mid-1970s rates rose dramatically for high income earners, so that in 1978 the 
Congressional Budget Office estimates an effective top tax rate of 25 percent 
on capital gains compared to 22 percent in the late 1970s and rates of 14 
percent in the early 1980s. Table 1 lists the most significant changes over 
h. . d13 t is per10 . 
Figure 1 plots the maximum rates on dividend income and capital gains 
incomes over the period 1962-1988. This figure provides a graphical 
illustration of the ordering of tax regimes. We choose the maximum rates as 
our primary focus since as is well known, the primary recipients of capital 
gains incomes are concentrated in upper income earners. For 1982 the behavior 
of the very top rate is a deceptive measure of the behavior of the tax 
treatment of dividends for high income earners because the tax reductions of 
1981 disproportionately favor those with incomes over $215,400. The rankings 
were adjusted slightly to account for this.14 Otherwise, the tax regimes are 
clearly ranked. It is important to note that in ranking years from "most 
favorable to dividends" to "least favorable to dividends" we have assumed that 
inflation affects dividend income and capital gains tax income equally. With a 
non-indexed Federal Tax code (as was the case through the high inflation 
period of the 1970s) bracket creep adversely affects the tax treatment of 
dividends. Since capital gains taxes are levied on nominal capital gains, 
inflation also adversely affects the tax treatment of capital gains. We 
implicitly assume that the effect of inflation on the differential tax 
treatment of dividends and capital gains is insignificant. 
years by tax regime is presented in Table 2. 
5. Description of the Non-parametric Tests. 
The ranking of 
The generic signalling model does not predict a particular functional 
relationship between firm type and signal strength (here, firm value and tax 
regime, holding dividend yield constant) . 15 The sole prediction is that of a 
13 All rates quoted are for married couples. 
14A!ternative rankings of this tax regime, including dropping it from the 
analysis, did not affect the results. 
15For instance, a simple linear regression is, in fact, an inappropriate way to 
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monotonic relationship between type and signal strength, so a direct non­
parametric test of this monotonicity condition is appropriate. 
Even ignoring functional form concerns, it is no easier to interpret the 
results from a time series regression. Using a different dummy variable for 
each tax regime, one is left with determining whether the signs on the dummies 
are consistent with signalling theory: one must determine whether the signs 
have the desired monotonic relationship. 
form, one is still left with a test of rank. 
Thus, even after imposing functional 
An additional concern is that, to implement a test of the monotonicity 
condition, one must control for the effect of differences in dividend yields 
across firms since the theory predicts that expected return is an increasing 
function of dividend yield.16 Any methodology that does not separate out 
portfolios according to their dividend yield implicitly imposes a linear 
relationship between dividend yield and return. One could imagine forming 
portfolios sorted by dividend yield for each announcement date. But then the 
beta for each portfolio would have to be estimated since the resulting 
portfolios would be too small to be assumed well diversified. In contrast, 
the direct tests proposed here can easily control for dividend yield across 
large portfolios and allow for testing of the model without imposing 
unnecessary, and potentially false, parametric restrictions. 
We propose two non-parametric tests that may be used to test the 
signalling theory of dividends. Kendall's i: calculates an estimate of the 
correlation between the ranks of tax type and the level of the signalling 
variable (excess return). Kendall's distribution-free test for independence 
(K), is based on 'Kendall's i:. This test examines the hypothesis that X, Y 
variables of a bivariate population are independent. The test is designed to 
detect a class of alternatives associated with either positive or negative 
values of i:. The second test we examine is Heoffding's distribution-free test 
for independence (D). This test examines the hypothesis that X, Y variables of 
test signalling theory, since it perforce fits a linear relationship on the 
data when the true relationship may be non-linear. 
161mplicitly this suggests problems with interpretations of the standard event 
study which regresses excess return on dividend yield, but fails to control 
for tax regime. Systematic co-variation in dividend yield and tax regime over 
time can lead to 'spurius' signalling findings. 
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a bivariate population are independent. The test is designed to detect a much 
broader class of alternatives than Kendall's K and unlike K it is consistent 
when tau is zero and the null distribution is false. These tests can be found 
in Hollander and Wolfe (1973). 
5.1 Kendall's Tau and Kendall's Distribution Free Test for Independence. 
The advantage of Kendall's tau is that its distribution approaches the 
normal distribution quite rapidly. Thus, the normal approximation is better 
for this statistic than for others of its type such as Spearman' s  rho. 
The statistic is calculated as follows. Assume that the data consist of 
a bivariate random sample, (X, Y), of size n. Define as concordant two 
observation pairs if both members of one observation are larger than the 
respective members of the other observation pair, for example (1, 3), (2, 4) .  
Let N 0  denote the number of concordant pairs out of the total ( � ) = n(n-1)/2
possible pairs. Let N denote the remaining pairs (the number of discordant d 
pairs, for 
N - N c d 
n ( n-1 )/2 
example (4, 1) and (2, 3)). Kendall's tau is calculated as T = 
17 The hypothesis that we desire to test is the one-tailed test for 
positive association since the monotonicity hypothesis implies a positive 
relationship between the relative tax disadvantage of dividends ( our X series) 
and the excess return associated with any given level of dividend yield (our Y 
series). Thus, the null (T = 0) and (one-sided) alternative hypotheses to be
tested can be written as: 
H : X and Y are mutually independent. 0 
H : there is a tendency for the larger values of X to be paired with 1 
the larger values of Y. 
A test based simply on N - N ct' Kendall's distribution-free test for c 
independence has wider usage. This test 
hypothesis of mutual independence. Formally: 
statistic is based upon the null 
17 
Thus, tau measures whether there are more discordant or concordant pairs. 
With two perfectly positively correlated variables, all pairs are concordant 
and T = l. With two perfectly negatively correlated series, all pairs are 
discordant and T = -1.  With two independent series, the expected number of 
concordant and discordant pairs is identical so that the expected value of T 
is 0. 
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H0: P(X ,,; a and Y ,,; bl 
= P(X ,,; alP(Y ,,; bl V a,b. 
The statistic used to test this hypothesis is K, where K is defined in 
the following way: 
1. For I "' "' j
n 
2. Set K = L 
i = 1 
"' n  
where 
n 
L 
j =1 
calculate l;;(X
1
, X
j'
Y
1
,Y/ 
l;;(a,b,c,dl = 
i;;(X .. X .• Y .• Y). l J 1 J 
( +] -I 
if (a-c)(b-dl > 0
if (a-c)(b-d) < 0.  
3. For a one-sided test of the null hypothesis versus the 
alternative hypothesis, for example, T > 0, the test at the ex
level of significance would be
reject H if K "= k(ex,nl 0 
accept H0 if K < k(ex,nl, 
where the constant k(ex,nl satisfies P 0 [ K "= k(ex,nl J = ex, and K = 
N - N .  
c d 
The large sample approximation of the Kendall K statistic is given by 
K - E ( Kl0 KL = ������� 
[var ( K l  
]1/2 
0 
= 
K 
1/2 [n(n-1) (2n +5 l/18] 
When H is true the test statistic KL has an asymptotic N(O,l) distribution. 0 
The Normal approximation to the finite sample test would be 
reject H if KL "' z(ex) 0 
accept H if KL < z(ex). 0 
5.2 Heoffding's Distribution-Free Test for Independence. 
Since we are concerned with examining the data in the context of a one­
tailed test for positive rank order correlation we use this test primarily to 
verify the results based on Kendall's K (since Heoffding's test cannot 
distinguish betv.reen positive and negative rank order correlation). Since 
pooling equilibria result in a prediction of T equal to zero, we use this test 
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to check for alternatives of dependence when T is equal to zero ( recall that 
Kendall's K is inconsistent if T = 0). 
To test the hypothesis that the random variables X and Y are independent, 
namely that 
P [ X " x and Y " y J = P [ X " x JP [ Y " y J V x ,  y
we make the same assumptions as for Kendall's K and construct the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis of independence as follows, 
1.
2. 
Rank X , X  , . . . . .  ,X1 2 n 
this joint ranking, 
Rank Y , Y  , .  . . .  . ,Y 1 2 n 
this joint ranking, 
jointly and let r 
i = 1 ,2 , .  . . .  . ,n.
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jointly and let s 
i = 1 ,2, . . . . .  ,n. 
i 
denote the rank of X i 
denote the rank of Y 
in 
in 
3. Let c denote the number of sample pairs (X , Y ) for which bothi a a 
4. 
X < X and Y < Y i a 1 a 
Set Q = f 
l = 1 
(r - J)(r. - 2)(s - l)(s.  - 2) 1 i I 
(r - 2)(s - 2)c i i i 
c (c - 1 ) .  i i 
The Heoff ding D statistic is 
D = 
Q - 2 ( n-2 ) R  + ( n-2) ( n-3 ) S  
n(n-1 ) ( n - 2 )  (n-3 ) ( n-4 ) 
5.  For a two sided alternative versus the alternative that X and Y 
are dependent19, at the ex level of significance 
iS
Since the X series is the tax regime, a qualitative ranking, the ranking r is 
simply the ranking R from table 2. 
19The D statistic tests against a broad range of alternatives. Note in 
particular that D tests against alternatives where the X's and Y's are 
positively associated and alternatives where the X's and Y's are negatively 
associated. Unlike T, D does not distinguish between discordance and 
concordance; only 2-tailed tests are appropriate. 
(1973) or Heoffding (1948) for more details. 
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See Hollander and Wolfe 
reject H if D " d(cx,n) 0 
accept H if D < d(cx,n). 0 
Here, d is a constant which satisfies the equation 
P 0 [ Do: d(cx,nl] = ex. Values of d and a for n = 5,6, 7,8 and 9 are
given in Hollander and Wolfe (1973). The large sample 
approximation to the D statistic is given by nD + {1/36); p­
values for this distribution are in Hollander and Wolfe. 
6 Data. 
We test for the monotonic relationship between tax rates and excess 
returns predicted by dividend signalling models using American stock market 
information provided by the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP). 
Information on stock returns, firm value, and cash disbursement distribution 
information, data for price, shares outstanding and all dividend distribution 
information was obtained from the CRSP monthly master file andthe CRSP daily 
returns file was used to obtain stock return information. The period of 
analysis begins in July 1962 when daily returns were first collected. 
For a firm to be considered part of the sample it had to meet the 
following criteria: 
(1) The firm had to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange as of 
July 1962 or later. 
(2) Firms are only considered over the period when they make regular 
I h d' 'd d 20quarter y cas 1v1 en s. 
(3) A complete set of price, dividend distribution and return 
information was available for the declaration date of the 
dividend. 
For each event (declaration of 
calculate both firm size and dividend 
a dividend) 
. Id 21y1e . 
occurring at time t, we 
In constructing the dividend 
20F h . 't f f' . or t e maJor1 y o irms in
pattern was a quarterly dividend. 
these firms were included. 
the sample their cash dividend disbursement 
In addition year-end �1extra" dividends for 
21The dividend yield rneasure employed is a short-terrn rneasure (one-day return) 
that takes account of dividend size but not dividend timing. This biases it in 
favor of finding tax-related effects. For our purposes this is preferable to 
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yield and firm size variables, it is important to note that since the 
distribution information is provided by the monthly master file, the price and 
shares outstanding information are available only for the last trading day in 
each month. However, dividend declaration dates and the dollar amount of the 
dividends are available for the actual event date within an event month. To 
take account of the fact that for any event occurring in month t, an 
investor's information set would only contain information known at t-1, firm 
size and dividend yield are computed using month t-1 price data. Thus, 
dividend yield is defined as the dollar amount of the cash dividend divided by 
the price in the month prior to the event month, and firm size is defined as 
the prior month price times the number of shares outstanding. 
In investigating the monotonic relationship between tax regimes and 
excess return we separately control for any other variable that may impact on 
excess return. We therefore construct portfolios categorized by dividend 
yield and firm size. Our prediction is that for any level of dividend yield 
the information released should be more favorable the more disadvantageous the 
tax treatment of dividends. 
variations in dividend yield. 
We therefore clearly need to control for 
In addition, there are well-documented 
intertemporal variations in average dividend yields for which we wish to 
control. The importance of firm size is well documented in studies of asset 
pricing (see Keim (1985) or Bajaj and Vijh (1990)). 22
For each year, therefore, the total number of events for all firms in the 
sample were categorized based on the size of the calculated dividend yield. 
In preliminary work we experimented with various grid sizes. 23 All of our
reported results are for the dividend yield groupings increasing in increments 
of 0.53. Two considerations Jed us to choose this dividend yield grouping. 
First, find the vast majority of quarterly dividend yields are below 23. 
Second, in constructing excess returns for each dividend yield portfolio we 
a Jong-term measure that is biased against finding tax effects (see Rumsey 
(1988) and Kalay and Michaely (1992) for a discussion of timing effects and 
measurement of tax effects of dividends). 
22Also, it is possible that the information released may be a function of firm
size (e.g. analysts reports may reveal more information about marge firms 
than small firms, requiring Jess information signalling for these firms). 
23Dividend yield divisions in increments of 0.23 and 0.33 were examined. No
substantive difference in results was found. 
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follow the methodology of Brown and Warner ( 1980) and assume that each 
portfolio is sufficiently large that it is well diversified (so that its beta 
is constant over time). Equally important, to the extent that there is 
heterogeneity in the amount of public information about firms within a year, 
aggregation into large portfolios permits 'laws of large number' arguments 
that equal dividend yield portfolios are 'informationally' identical over 
time. Based on these considerations, we create five portfolios based on 
dividend yield size increments of 0.5%: 
Portfolio A: 0 < dy < 0.5 % 
Portfolio B: 0.5 "' dy < 1 .0  % 
Portfolio C: 1 .0 "' dy < 1 .5 % 
Portfolio D: 1 . 5  "' dy < 2.0 % 
Portfolio E: dy " 2.0 % 
For all firms, the dividend distribution events for each year are then 
categorized based on these dividend increments. Each firm event is then 
assigned to one of the portfolios as above. We then calculate for each 
dividend yield portfolio (A through El the excess returns for each year 1962 
through 1988. For each event documented in each dividend yield portfolio, the 
associated daily stock return for that event date is recorded. The average 
daily return for each dividend yield portfolio is then calculated. This 
average daily return for the event date is converted into an annual return and 
the annual return on the market portfolio is then subtracted to give us the 
dividend yield portfolio's annual excess return. The market portfolio is 
characterized as the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks listed on the NYSE 
as supplied by CRSP. The non-parametric tests were run using these complete 
dividend yield portfolio's excess returns. For the high dividend yield 
portfolio, E, for many of the early years of our study the number of firms 
paying such large dividends was too small to be sure that the portfolio would 
be well diversified. Hence the number of tax regimes considered for portfolio 
E is smaller than for portfolios A through D. 
We also control for possible size effects by sub-dividing dividend 
yield portfolios A through E on the basis of firm size. This controls both 
for the standard size effects and for any systematic differences in public 
information across firms of different sizes (for instance, there may be less 
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public information about small firms so that more information is revealed 
through dividends). For each year, the portfolios were ranked with respect tb 
firm size and then split into three separate (but equal) size groups, large 
(L), medium (M) and small (S). For each of these new portfolios, the annual 
excess return was calculated in the same manner as with the undivided dividend 
yield portfolios. The non-parametric tests were run on these size-based 
dividend portfolios using the calculated annual excess returns. 
Many studies have found a relationship between dividend yield and excess 
return and interpreted these results as evidence of tax effects resulting for 
the differential treatment of dividends and capital gains (see Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy 1979). These results are generally derived from estimates drawn 
from cross-sectional analysis which are aggregated over time. This time 
aggregation ignores the possibility that the yield-return relationship may 
vary through time due to changes in the tax regime. However, signalling 
theory predicts that the strength of the relationship between stock returns 
and dividend yields varies directly with the extent of the tax disadvantage of 
dividends. 
results. 
Time aggregation across tax regimes can therefore bias the 
Recall too, that although this investigation is posed as a test of 
information-signalling models, that tax-based CAPM models provide the same 
predictions. Hence, a failure to to find the monotonic relationship provides 
strong evidence against the tax-effect theories which suggest that investors 
demand compensation in the form of higher pre-tax returns on high dividend 
stocks to compensate them for the tax cost of dividends. 
7. Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the tests of the theory for the 
complete portfolios grouped by dividend yield and table 4 presents the 
corresponding results for the portfolios split by both dividend yield and firm 
size. Looking first at table 3, the monotonicity prediction that we wish to 
test implies that there should be concordance between the excess returns and 
the relative tax disadvantage of dividend income. We can see from the 
estimate for tau of rank correlation that there are as many discordant as 
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concordant pairs24 and only for portfolio A may we reject the null hypothesis
of independence based on Kendall's distribution free test statistic for 
independence ( K l. However , note that while we reject independence for 
portfolio A, the indication is that there is a negative association between 
tax regime and excess return for this portfolio, and not the positive 
correlation that signalling theory predicts ! The large sample approximation 
of Kendall's K statistic, (KL), is also significant at the 5% level for this 
portfolio. Heoff ding' s distribution free test for independence (D) shows no 
significance for any dividend yield group and so according to this test, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence for any portfolio. 
Table 4 presents results for the size-controlled dividend yield 
portfolios. Only for portfolio (A-S), the smallest firms paying dividends 
between 0% and 0.5%, do we reject independence based on Kendall's T at the 5% 
level. For portfolios B -S and E-S (the smallest firms paying dividends 
between 0.5% and 1% and over 2%, respectively) we reject independence at the 
10% level. The result for A-S is consistent with table 3 where portfolio A 
was the only portfolio showing significant discordance. Recall that 
discordance is not consistent with the signalling hypothesis which is being 
tested. Again there are as many negative values as positive values for our 
estimates of i:. Heoffding's test statistic D, shows no significance for any 
of the portfolios in the table. Recall that unlike Kendall's K ,  Heoffding's D
statistic is consistent when i: is zero and the null distribution is false. 
Examining table 4 it is clear that many of our estimates for i: are very close 
to zero. Based on these results , we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
. d d 25in epen ence .  
In summary, we find no evidence of a positive association between excess 
return and the relative tax treatment of dividends. 26 Heoffding's D does not
24rntuitively , if these series are truly independent, one would expect that in
addition to finding no significance, one would also find an equal number of 
positive and negative test statistics. While this adds no formal power to the 
test results, this finding of symmetry around zero might make one more 
confident than if for example, we had found all the test statistics 
insignificant but positive. 
25 Values of Spellmans' rho for each portfolio were also calculated . These
produced identical l evels of significance to those presented for Kendall• s tau 
and hence are omitted . 
26we also considered the possibility that the effective capital gains tax is
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reject independence for any of the portfol ios considered and Kendall 's T finds 
ev idence of s ignif icant concordance for none of the portfol ios (while f ind ing 
d iscordance for one aggregated and 
(Statistically insignificant) discordance 
two 
is as 
disaggregated 
common as 
portfo lios). 
(statistically 
insignificant) concordance looking across the set of portfolio estimates. 
8. Conclusions
Bagwell and Shaven (1989) estimate that $68 billion in cash div idends 
were paid in 1985. The issue addressing researchers is why, g iven 
the apparently h igh assoc iated tax costs, are dividends issued? One can 
always postulate that, ceteris paribus, certain investors have a preference 
for dividends over an identical dollar amount of capital gains, but such 
relative preferences would have to be extreme in l ight of the tax costs. It 
is also hard to believe that d ividends are real ly irrelevant g iven the 
enormous resources that f irms devote to determining their d ividend po licy . 
This paper tests whether the underlying explanation for div idends is 
s ignalling based. We show a common prediction of all (scalar or vector) 
d ividend s ignall ing models is that of a positive rank order correlation 
between the tax disadvantage of d ividends relative to capital gains and the 
amount of "good" news revealed for any g iven level of div idend payout. 
We present tests of this monotonicity prediction using data on d iv idend 
y ield and excess returns for American stocks for the time period July 1962 to 
December 1988. Over th is period we detail s ixteen d istinct tax reg imes, 
ordered accord ing to the relative tax d isadvantage of div idends. Constructing
portfolios ranked by div idend yield and size we test whether there is any 
pos itive association between the relative tax disadvantage of d iv idends and 
the excess returns assoc iated with any level of dividend payout. Us ing 
d istribution-free tests for independence we f ind no ev idence of the predicted 
positive monoton ic relationship. 
Our failure to reject the independence of tax reg ime and excess returns 
zero due to dynamic tax 
identical to those presented 
shield ing strategies . 
here :  portfolios A and 
The results are a lmost 
A-S still have signif icant 
discordance at the 53 level and portfolios C-1\11 and E-S have
concordance at the 10% leve l. No other portfolios exhibited a 
monotonic relationship between excess returns and dividend tax rates. 
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signif icant 
signif icant 
for any 
support 
given 
of the 
dividend yield implies that we 
signalling theory of dividends. 
cannot find any evidence in 
Becausewe test only the 
weakest signalling prediction -- monotonicity, we provide strong evidence that 
if there is information content in dividends, then the information provided by 
dividends is independent of the marginal cost of using dividends as a signal. 
This result is inconsistent with any tax-based model of dividend 
and more generally with any dividend signalling model provided 
signalling, 
that the 
marginal investor is taxed. One can view our findings as indirect support for 
Dybvig and Zender (1991) who show that if one endogenizes the form of 
managerial reward scheme within the context of many of these models, then the 
optimal managerial reward scheme is such that no signalling occurs in 
equilibrium. Finally, it is important to note that our findings are 
inconsistent with tax-based CAPM arguments. Investors do not appear to demand 
compensation in the form of higher pre-tax returns on high dividend stocks to 
compensate them for the tax cost of dividends. 
It is also important to stress that the paper does not find that no 
information is revealed through dividend announcements. Indeed, the evidence 
of positive excess returns associated with greater dividend announcements is 
indicative of information release. Rather, the results reveal that 
information release is an indirect by-product of dividend announcements 
instead of a direct signalling goal. By looking at the relationship between 
excess returns and the marginal tax cost of dividends we distinguish between 
signalling explanations and indirect information release. This distinction is 
only possible because we look at the marginal tax side, rather than looking 
more directly at the relationship between dividend yield and excess return. 
The information content of dividends is uncorrelated with the tax costs of 
dividends, and hence inconsistent with signalling. 
Such indirect information release is consistent with agency models of 
dividends in which dividends help resolve agency problems in the firm (greater 
dividends reveal more "free cash"). To our knowledge the analysis of Lang and 
Litzenberger (1991) is the only attempt so far to test an agency-based model 
of dividends. They compare a cash flow signalling theory of dividends with 
Jensen's (1986) "free cash flow" theory of dividends (an agency theory of 
dividends) and find weak evidence supportive of the existence of agency 
problems ar1s 1ng from inefficient use of free cash flovv. 
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TABLE 1 
Major tax changes affecting capital gains and dividend income� 
(Income tax rates quoted are for married couples) 
Year(s) Income Tax 
Changes. 
Inclusion 
Rate 
1962/63 Top rate = 90% 50% 
1964 Rates lowered , 50% 
top rate 77%. 
1965/66/67 Rates lowered, 50% 
top rate 70% 
1968 Tax surcharge 50% 
of 7.5% 
1969 Tax surcharge 50% 
of 10%. 
1970 Tax surcharge 50% 
of 2.5% 
1971 No changes 50% 
1972/76. No major changes 50% 
1977/78. No major changes 50% 
1979/80 No major changes 60% 
1981 Rates lowered 5% 60% 
1982 Top rates cut to 60% 
1983 
1984 
1985/86. 
1987 
1988 
50% from 69%. 
Other rates 
lowered by 10%. 
Rates lowered 10% 60% 
Rates lowered 60% 
No major changes, 60% 
some bracket 
adjustments. 
Lower rates, 100% 
reduced number 
of brackets. 
Lower rates. 100% 
Alternate Holding 
Maximum Rate Period (mths) 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
29.5% 
b32.5% 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
28% 
None 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
9 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
6 
6 
6 
6 
a. Income tax data from tables A-3 to A-6 of Pechman ( 1987), updated to
1988 from Standard Federal Tax Reports, Commerce Clearing House Inc, 
(1988). Capital gains tax treatment obtained from Standard Federal Tax 
Reports, Commerce Clearing House Inc. (1962-1988). 
b With $50,000 cap on alternate maximum rate shield. All capital 
gains over $50,000 per individual taxed at 50% of regular marginal rate. 
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TABLE 2 
aRankings from most favorable to dividends R1 to least favorable R16 .
RI 1988 
R2 1987 
R3 1985-86 
R4 1984 
R
S
1983 
R6 1982 
R7 1972-78 
RS 1979-80 
R9 1981 
R IO
1965-67 
R ll 1971 
Rl2 1970 
R l3 1969 
R l4 1968 
RlS 1964 
R l6 1962-63 
a. R .  denotes the jth most favorable difference in tax rates between
J 
dividends and capita l gains (for example in 1988 this difference is 
zero , in 1962-1963 for the highest tax bracket , this difference is 65% 
(90% on dividend income versus 25% on capital gains)). See figure I. 
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n 
A I 6  
B I 6  
c I 6  
D 1 6  
E I I  
T a. b l e  3 
Non-Parametric Test Statistics for the 
Undivided Sample 
X = TAX REGIME RANKING 
Y = EXCESS RETURN 
i K KL D 
- 0 . 4I67 -50 - 2 . 25 t 0 . 004 
- 0 .  I833 -22  -0 . 99 O . OOI  
O.  I 33 16  0 . 72 - 0 . 00 1  
0 .  I833 22 0 . 99 - 0 . 00 1  
0 . 2 1 1 0 . 8563 - 0 . 0008 
nD+( l/36) 
0 . 098I 
0 . 048I 
0 . 0097 
0 . 143 
0 . 0I57 
t denotes significance at the a = 0 . 0 5 level .
Key for Tables 3 and 4 .
A - E represents portfolios with lowest (A) to highest (E) dividend yield. 
S, M, L denote firm sizes small, medium, large respectively.
n is the number of tax regimes over the period. 
i is Kendall's tau statistic. 
K is Kendall's K statistic. 
KL is the large sample approximation to Kendall's K.
D is Heoffding's D statistic. 
nD + -1/36 is the large sample approximation to D.
2 8  
A-L 
A-M 
A-S 
B-L 
B-M 
B-S 
C-L 
C-M 
C-S 
D - L  
D - M  
D - S  
E - L  
E - M  
E - S  
T a b l e  4 
Non-Parametric Test Statistic for Portfol ios 
Divided by Firm S i z e  
n 
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 6  
1 1
1 1
n I 
X = TAX REGIME RANKING 
Y = EXCESS RETURN
A K KL • 
- 0 . 2167 -26 - 1 . 1706 
- 0 . 0833 - 1 0  - 0 . 4502 
- 0 . 41 7  - 5 0  - 2 . 25 1  t 
- 0 . 0667 -8 - 0 . 3602 
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